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IMPACT OF HIGHER-ORDER UNCERTAINTY
JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
Abstract. In some games, the impact of higher-order uncertainty is very
large, implying that present economic theories may be misleading as these
theories assume common knowledge of the type structure after specifying the
ﬁrst or the second orders of beliefs. Focusing on normal-form games in which
the players’ strategy spaces are compact metric spaces, we show that our
key condition, called “global stability under uncertainty,” implies a variety
of results to the eﬀect that the impact of higher-order uncertainty is small.
Our central result states that, under global stability, the maximum change in
equilibrium strategies due to changes in players’ beliefs at orders higher than
k is exponentially decreasing in k. Therefore, given any need for precision,
we can approximate equilibrium strategies by specifying only ﬁnitely many
orders of beliefs.
Key words: higher-order uncertainty, stability, incomplete information,
equilibrium.
JEL Numbers: C72, C73.
1. Introduction
Most economic theories are based on equilibrium analysis of models in which
the players’ types (following Harsanyi (1967)) are simply taken as their beliefs
about some underlying uncertainty, such as the marginal cost of a ﬁrm or the
value of an object for a buyer, and rarely include a player’s beliefs about the
other players’ beliefs about the underlying uncertainty. Using such a type struc-
ture implicitly assumes that, conditional on the ﬁrst-order beliefs about some
payoﬀ-relevant uncertainty, all of a player’s higher-order beliefs are common
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knowledge.
1 Even the literature on global games (Carlsson and van Damme
(1993)) and on forecasting others’ forecasts (Townsend (1983)) makes this as-
sumption (in a ﬁnite-dimensional space of payoﬀ uncertainty.)
2
There is now an extensive literature, however, that emphasizes that in some
games higher-order uncertainty has as large an impact on equilibrium behavior
as lower-order uncertainty (see Rubinstein (1989), Kajii and Morris (1998) and
Morris (2002)). As Rubinstein (1989) illustrates, the equilibria of a game in
which a particular piece of information is common knowledge can be profoundly
diﬀerent from the equilibria of games in which this information is mutually
known only up to some ﬁnite order – no matter how many orders we consider.
Most importantly, when the higher-order beliefs have large impact, the present
economic theories may be misleading.
3 This large impact is also disturbing
because it is hard to believe that we would ever know a player’s high-order
beliefs with any precision. Without such knowledge, we cannot make accurate
predictions when the impact of higher-order uncertainty is large. Moreover,
assuming that higher-order beliefs correspond to higher-order reasoning, such a
l a r g ei m p a c ti m p l i e st h a tt h eb o u n d so fr a t i o n a l i t ya r ea tl e a s ta si m p o r t a n ta s
the basic incentives. This would necessitate a change of paradigm for analyzing
these problems. Therefore, it is of fundamental importance to classify games in
which high-order uncertainty has little impact.
In this paper, we provide a broad set of suﬃcient conditions under which
high-order uncertainty has little impact. Our main suﬃcient condition is called
“global stability under uncertainty.” It states that the variation in each player’s
best response is always less than the variation in his beliefs about the others’
actions (according to the embedding metric deﬁned later), multiplied by a con-
stant b that is less than 1. Under certain continuity assumptions, we show that
1Here we use the standard terminology: a player’s ﬁrst-order beliefs are his beliefs about
the underlying uncertainty; his second-order beliefs are roughly his beliefs about the other
players’ ﬁrst-order beliefs, and so on.
2For an illustration of how a model with such an assumption can be deceptive regarding
the impact of higher-order uncertainty, see Section 2.3.
3For example, the Coase conjecture may fail when we introduce second-order uncertainty
as shown by Feinberg and Skrzypacz (2002).HIGHER-ORDER UNCERTAINTY 3
global stability under uncertainty is closely related to the standard concept of
global stability of best-response correspondence (under certainty). For games
with one-dimensional strategy spaces, we further provide a simple second-order
condition that guarantees global stability under uncertainty.
We consider ﬁnite-person games in which the strategy spaces are compact
metric spaces and there is some payoﬀ-relevant source of uncertainty that comes
from a complete, separable metric space. We work in universal type space,
where the players’ types are their entire hierarchy of beliefs about the underlying
uncertainty, allowing players to entertain any coherent set of beliefs. We ﬁxa
(Bayesian) Nash equilibrium of this game. Note that, since every type space can
be embedded in universal type space, this corresponds to ﬁxing an equilibrium
for all type spaces simultaneously. Let us also ﬁx a player’s beliefs up to a certain
order k. Our main result states that, assuming global stability, the maximum
variation in the player’s equilibrium strategy, as we vary all his higher-order
beliefs, is at most bk t i m e sac o n s t a n t .T h a tm e a n st h a t ,i fw ew a n tt od e t e r m i n e
the equilibrium behavior within a certain margin of error (e.g., in order to check
the validity of a certain theoretical prediction), we only need to specify ﬁnitely
many orders of beliefs, where the required number of orders k∗ is a logarithmic
function of the desired precision. In particular, the impact of an erroneous
common knowledge assumption at orders higher than k∗ will be less than the
speciﬁed bound. This is a contribution to the goal set out by Wilson (1987) of
“successive reductions in the base of common knowledge required to conduct
useful analyses of practical problems.”
We have so far focused on the maximum change in a player’s equilibrium
strategy due to any change in his higher-order beliefs. We also investigate
the relationship of the change in strategy to the size of the change in beliefs.
T o w a r d st h i sg o a l ,ﬁrstly, we deﬁne an “embedding metric” on beliefs at each
order (as well as on beliefs about the other players’ actions). This metric has
the crucial property of preserving the distances in lower-order beliefs when they
are embedded in the space of higher-order beliefs as point masses, allowing
us to sensibly compare variations at diﬀerent orders. We ask how much a4 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
player’s strategy varies as we vary his belief at some order k a n dk e e pa l lh i s
other beliefs ﬁxed. (To be able to do this without violating the coherency of
his beliefs, we need an independence assumption about the diﬀerent orders of
beliefs, an assumption that is satisﬁed in traditional “independent private value”
environments.) Now we can deﬁne the marginal impact of a change in kth-order
beliefs as the variation in equilibrium strategies divided by the size of this change
in beliefs as measured by our embedding metric. We show that, under global
stability and the independence assumption, the marginal impact of changes
in kth-order beliefs is at most bk times a constant. This formalizes our notion
that, under global stability, the marginal impact of higher-order beliefs decreases
exponentially. In that case, precision in lower-order beliefs will be much more
important than the precision in higher-order beliefs in approximating a problem.
It also follows that the players’ equilibrium behavior would not change much
if they formed erroneous higher-order beliefs. These assertions may all sound
very natural; we should emphasize that they may easily fail when global stability
does not hold. In particular, with linear best-responses, the marginal impact of
kth-order beliefs actually increases exponentially in k whenever global stability
does not hold.
It also follows from our assumptions that equilibrium behavior is continuous
with respect to the product topology on type space that comes from the em-
bedding metric. Under the assumption that the best-response correspondence
is singleton and satisﬁes global stability under uncertainty, this further implies
that the correspondence that takes each type to the set of all equilibrium actions
for that type is lower semi-continuous.
Although there is a sizeable literature on the impact of higher-order uncer-
tainty following Rubinstein (1989), the focus of most studies has been relax-
ation of common knowledge and lower semi-continuity of equilibrium in the
worst-case scenarios, such as approximating common knowledge with common
p-beliefs (Monderer and Samet (1989)), robustness of equilibrium against (pos-
sibly substantial) payoﬀ uncertainty with small probability (Fudenberg, Kreps,
and Levine (1988) and Kajii and Morris (1997)), and strong topologies underHIGHER-ORDER UNCERTAINTY 5
which equilibrium is lower semi-continuous uniformly over all games (Monderer
and Samet (1997) and Kajii and Morris (1998)). Most closely related to our
work, Morris (2002) analyzes the impact of higher-order uncertainty within a
model with linear best responses, reaching the conclusion that impact of higher-
order beliefs can be arbitrarily large if we require a uniform bound over all
games. Our focus diﬀers in two ways. Firstly, we measure the impact of higher-
order uncertainty within a single game (dropping the uniformity requirement).
Second, while our suﬃcient condition implies continuity of best response, most
of these papers analyze matrix games and naturally use the supremum metric
on the mixed strategies, when the best response is generically discontinuous.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we illustrate the
relation between stability and dampening impact of higher-order beliefs using
games with linear best responses. In Section 3, we present our basic model with
independence assumption and introduce the embedding metric; we introduce
global stability in Section 4 and provide suﬃcient conditions and examples for
it in Section 5. Our major results are presented in Section 6 with independence
assumption, and our main result is extended beyond this assumption in Section
7. Section 8 concludes. Some proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2. Examples with Linear Best Responses
We will now show how dampening impact of higher-order uncertainty is equiv-
alent to stability in games with linear best-response functions, such as the linear
Cournot duopoly. This illustrates the close relationship between these two con-
cepts which we will establish in a broader context in the later sections.
2.1. Cournot Duopoly. Consider a Cournot duopoly where the inverse-demand
function is given by
P =1− Q
where P is the price of a good and Q = q1 + q2 where qi is the supply of ﬁrm
i ∈ N = {1,2}. The marginal cost of ﬁrm i is denoted by ci, so that its payoﬀ6 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
function is
ui (q1,q 2)=qi (1 − q1 − q2 − ci).
The inverse-demand and payoﬀ functions are common knowledge.
Each ﬁrm knows its own marginal cost. If we assumed that the marginal costs
were common knowledge, then we would have the classical complete-information
case. We could also allow incomplete information by assuming that (c1,c 2) is
drawn from a commonly known distribution, representing the beliefs of j about
ci conditional on its own cost cj. If we further assumed that c1 and c2 were
independently distributed, then this would correspond to the assumption that
the ﬁrms’ beliefs about the other ﬁrms’ cost are common knowledge. In this
paper, we do not make such strong informational assumptions; we want to allow
variations in all levels of uncertainty. Firm j has a probability distribution t1
j
on ci, representing its beliefs about ci.F i r mi has also a probability distribution
t2
i on t1




j , representing kth-order beliefs of ﬁrm i.F i r m
i’s type is the entire list ti =( ci,t 1
i,t 2
i,...).
As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle (q∗
1,q∗
2),w h e r eq∗
i : ti 7→ q∗
i(ti) speciﬁes ﬁrm i’s supply as a
function of its type, is an equilibrium iﬀ q∗
i(ti) maximizes the expected payoﬀ
of type ti given the strategy q∗
j of the other ﬁrm. That is, equilibrium strategy
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Here Ei [cj] depends only on t1
i,t h eb e l i e f so fi about the cost of j, EiEj [ci]
depends only on t2
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when k is odd; the last term is EiEjEi ···Ej[q∗
i]/2k when k is even. In equilib-
rium, each ﬁrm’s supply will always be in [0,1]; hence the absolute value of the
last term is at most 1/2k.T h a ti s ,i fw eﬁxt h eb e l i e f su pt okth order, we know
the equilibrium strategy q∗ up to an error of at most 1/2k.
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1 − EiEj [ci]
8
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1 − EiEjEi [cj]
16
+ ···
where the coeﬃcient of the kth term is 1/2k.T h es i g n i ﬁcance of this formula is
that the coeﬃcients of expectations decrease exponentially as we go to higher-
order expectations.
2.2. General Case with Linear Best Responses. T h ea n a l y s i sa b o v ec a n
be easily generalized to the case with linear best-response functions
BRi = ai + bEi [sj]
where ai is the underlying parameter for player i (such as (1 − ci)/2)a n dsj is
the (unknown) action of player j. Now, the equilibrium strategies satisfy
(2.4) s
∗
i = ai + bEi [aj]+b
2EiEj [ai]+···+ b







when k is odd. The absolute value of the coeﬃcients will decrease exponentially,
resulting in a convergent inﬁnite series as above, if and only if |b| < 1.8 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
• Note that this corresponds precisely to the stability of the equilibrium of
the complete information game under the best-response correspondence.
• When the equilibrium is unstable, the impact of higher-order beliefs
in equilibrium is actually higher than that of lower-order beliefs, and
one must know the higher-order beliefs to an impossibly high level of
precision in order to predict behavior.
• Our derivation in this section relies only on the formation of higher-order
expectations–not on the particular type space used. Hence it applies
to any type structure.
• We are only able to use the substitution trick here to derive a simple
formula because of the linearity of the best-response function. In the
general case a player’s best response depends on the details of the entire
distribution (as noted by Morris (2000)) and there is no direct relation-
ship between a player’s best responses under certainty and uncertainty,
rendering such elementary analysis impossible and requiring the more
sophisticated tools of the following sections.
Note also that Morris and Shin (2003) and Morris (2002) obtain speciﬁc
examples with linear best responses similar to ours in this section. They focus
on diﬀerent issues; Morris and Shin (2003) focus on the role of public information
while Morris (2002) focus on the large impact of higher-order expectations in
the worst-case scenario (when the slope of the best response approaches 1).
2.3. A Traditional Type Structure. We have ex ante a ∼ N (0,1),a n d
each player i gets a private signal xi = a + εi where εi ∼ N (0,(1 − v)/v)
for some v ∈ (0,1) and a, ε1,a n dε2 are all independent. For each i,a s s u m e
BRi = E [a + bsj|xi]=ai+bE [sj|xi] for some b ≥ 0,w h e r eai ≡ E [a|xi]=vxi.
The above is all common knowledge.







When bv < 1, equilibrium seems intuitive. When bv > 1,h o w e v e r ,c o u n t e r i n -
tuitively the coeﬃcient of xi is negative and hence s∗
i is decreasing in xi.N o w ,HIGHER-ORDER UNCERTAINTY 9
write s∗
i as a series of higher order expectation as in (2.4). Since the kth-order
expectation of a is EiEjEi ...E j [a]=vkxi,w eh a v e
s
∗
i = vxi + bv
2xi + b
2v
3xi + ···+ b








Firstly, notice that when bv > 1, higher-order terms increase exponentially,
yielding a divergent series. This explodingly large impact of higher-order uncer-
tainty, however, does not appear in the directly computed formula in (2.5). Sec-
ond, when bv < 1 <b , we have a convergent series yielding seemingly intuitive
formula in (2.5), despite the fact that marginal contributions of higher-order ex-
pectations increase exponentially. This is only because our single-dimensional
type space forced the variations in higher-order expectations to decrease expo-
nentially,4 compensating the increases in marginal contributions. But in the
approximated real-life situation, the players will probably have higher-order
doubts about this model. In that case, their higher-order expectations may
vary signiﬁcantly, leading to dramatically diﬀerent behavior (under the equi-
librium of more accurate model). In that case, the model’s predictions about
the behavior will be misleading, and considerations about higher-order beliefs
within the model will yield a false sense of robustness.
3. Model with independence
We consider a game among players N = {1,2,...,n}. The source of underly-
ing uncertainty is a payoﬀ-relevant parameter a ∈ A where (A,d) is a compact
Polish space (i.e., a complete and separable metric space), where d is a metric
on set A. (In the Cournot example above a =( c1,c 2) ∈ [0,1]
2.) Each player
i has action space Si, which is a compact metric space, and utility function
ui : A × S → R where S =
Q
i Si.
Notation. Given any list X1,...,X n of sets, write X−i =
Q
j6=i Xj, x−i =
(x1,...,x i−1,x i+1,...,x n) ∈ X−i,a n d(xi,x −i)=( x1,...,x i−1,x i,x i+1,...,x n).
Likewise, for any family of functions fj : Xj → Yj, j ∈ N,w ed e ﬁne f−i : X−i →
Y−i by f−i (x−i)=( fj (xj))j6=i. Given any metric space (X,d),w r i t e∆(X) for
4This is a general phenomenon (see Samet (1998).)10 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
the space of probability distributions on X, suppressing the ﬁxed σ-algebra on
X which at least contains all open sets; when we use product spaces, we will
always use the product σ-algebra. We write di for the metric on Si for each
















We now deﬁne the players’ hierarchy of beliefs about the underlying parame-
ter a.W e c o n ﬁne ourself to the belief structures where a player’s beliefs are
independent from his own beliefs at other orders. We do this because we want
to be able to (i) vary a player’s kth-order beliefs without worrying about the
coherency of his beliefs and (ii) measure the impact of this change on equilib-
rium strategies without worrying about its impact through the changes in the
player’s beliefs at other orders. (The independence assumption will be dropped
in our main result.)
We deﬁne the beliefs (or type) of a player i inductively. His ﬁrst order beliefs
(about a) are represented by a probability distribution t1
i ∈ ∆1 ≡ ∆(A) on A.
His kth-order beliefs (about t
k−1
−i ) are represented by a probability distribution
tk



















of all these probability distributions. We write Ti for the set of all possible
types ti of player i.W e a l s o w r i t e T =
Q
i Ti for the set of all type proﬁles
t. His beliefs are represented by the product measure t1
i × t2
i × t3




i,...) at each order; that is, given any
Q∞
k=0 Xk ⊂ A × T−i,t h e






(Here, of course, we have used the independence assumption.) We write t\˜ tk
i
for the belief structure obtained by changing tk
i to ˜ tk
i in t; t\˜ tk
−i and ti\˜ tk
i are
deﬁned similarly.
Example 1. (Independent private value environment) Take any incomplete-
information game with payoﬀs ui (s;θi) for each i where each θi ∈ Θi is inde-
pendently distributed with some probability distribution Pi and privately known
by player i, and this is common knowledge. This game can be embedded in ourHIGHER-ORDER UNCERTAINTY 11
framework, by taking A = ∪iΘi, t1
i = δθi, t2
i = ˆ t2
i ≡ P−i◦ξ
−1 where P−i = Πj6=iPj
and ξ : θ−i 7→ Πj6=iδθj, and taking tk
i = ˆ tk
i ≡ δˆ t
k−1
−i for each k>2,w h e r eδx de-
notes the measure that puts probability 1 on {x}.
A strategy of a player i is a mapping
ti 7→ si (ti) ∈ Si,
that determines which action si (ti) he would choose given his type ti.W eﬁxa
Bayesian Nash equilibrium s∗ =( s∗
1,s ∗
2,...,s ∗
n), which must be such that s∗
i (ti)















the probability distribution t1
i × t2
i × t3
i ×··· at each ti and for each i.
Embedding metric. Throughout the paper, we will need a measure of the dis-
tances between probability distributions. We therefore introduce the following
metric, which we will call embedding metric.L e t (X,d) be any metric space.
Given any µ,µ0 ∈ ∆(X),w eﬁrst write
(3.1) ∆µ,µ0 = {ν ∈ ∆(X × X)|marg1ν = µ,marg2ν = µ
0}
for the set of all joint probability distributions with marginals µ and µ0,w h e r e
margi is the marginal distribution on the ith copy of X.N o w w e d e ﬁne our
embedding metric d on ∆(X) by setting
(3.2) d(µ,µ
0)= i n f
ν∈∆µ,µ0
Eν [d(x1,x 2)],
where Eν is the expectation operator with respect to ν and (x1,x 2) is a generic
member of X ×X. It is easy to verify that this is an extension in the following
sense: if µ and µ0 are point masses at x and x0, respectively, then d(µ,µ0)=
d(x,x0) – thus the notational convenience of using d for both metrics. An
equivalent deﬁnition is given by
(3.3) d(µ,µ
0)= i n f
Y ∼µ,Y 0∼µ0 E [d(Y,Y
0)]
where inf is taken over all pairs Y and Y 0 of X-valued random variables with
distributions µ and µ0, respectively, and coming from the same probability space,
and E is the expectation operator on this space.12 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
The embedding metric has the following property of preserving Lipschitz con-
tinuity; the proof is in the Appendix. Notice in the lemma that µ ◦ f−1 is the
distribution of f (Y ) for a random variable Y ∼ µ.
Lemma 1. Let (X,dX) and (Z,dZ) be two metric spaces, and f : X → Z be
such that
dZ (f (x),f(x
0)) ≤ λdX (x,x
0)( ∀x,x
0)











4. Stability and Higher-order Uncertainty
We are now ready to present our suﬃcient condition for the dampening impact
of higher order uncertainty: stability of equilibrium under the best-response
function. The global stability of equilibrium is usually deﬁned by the condition
that the variation in the best response is less than the variation in the other
players’ strategies under certainty.5 We will ﬁrst extend this notion to the best
response function under uncertainty, which is not directly related to the best
response function under certainty.
Best Responses.G i v e na n yp l a y e ri and any probability distribution π on
A × S−i,w ew r i t eBRi (π) for the best response of player i when his beliefs
about the underlying uncertainty a and the other players’ actions s−i are rep-
resented by π. Notice that we are taking the best response to be a function
rather than a correspondence. Under certain conditions (e.g., when the strat-
egy spaces are convex and utilities are strictly quasi-concave in own strategy),
the best-response correspondence will indeed be singleton. In general, however,
there may be multiple best responses. In those cases we will assume that the
equilibrium uses a single consistent selection from the best-response correspon-
dence. In the former case, the global stability deﬁned below will be a property
5The usual deﬁnition appears to be diﬀerent. For instance, in two player games we only
need that the product of maximum variations is less than 1. Of course, under this condition,
we could rescale our metrics on each strategy space so that our deﬁnition is also satisﬁed.HIGHER-ORDER UNCERTAINTY 13
of the game, while in the latter case, it will be a property of equilibrium. Under
the independence assumption, we will have π = t1
i × µ for some t1
i ∈ ∆(A)
and µ ∈ ∆(S−i). In that case, we will write BRi (t1
i,µ) instead of BRi (π).
When it does not lead to any confusion, we will sometimes suppress some of
the arguments (e.g., write BRi (µ) when t1
i is ﬁx e d )o rw r i t ei ti nt h ef o r mo f
BRi (a,s−i;ti), denoting the best response of player i when his type is ti,w h e r e
a and s−i are random variables.
Global Stability under uncertainty.W es a yt h a tglobal stability under un-
certainty holds iﬀ there exists b ∈ [0,1) such that, given any i ∈ N, t1
i ∈ ∆(A),
and any µ, µ0 ∈ ∆(S−i),
di (BRi (µ),BR i (µ
0)) ≤ bd−i (µ,µ
0),
where d−i is the embedding metric on ∆(S−i).
The required condition for global stability is the standard condition for Lip-
schitz continuity (of each BRi with respect to the embedding metric deﬁned
on ∆(S−i)) with the additional requirement that the constant b,w h i c hc a nb e
thought of as an upper bound on the absolute value of the slope, be less than
1. Of course, this is the same as saying that for each i there is a bi ∈ [0,1)
satisfying the above condition, since we can take b =m a x{b1,...,b n}.
Global stability is suﬃcient to guarantee that the impact of higher-order
beliefs on equilibrium is diminishing. This is formally expressed in the next
result. Consider a change in a player i’s kth-order beliefs from tk




so that i believes that the other players’ k − 1st order beliefs have changed
a c c o r d i n gt os o m em a p p i n gφ. The next result states that, in that case, the
change in equilibrium strategy of player i c a nb ea tm o s tb times the expected
maximum change in the other players’ equilibrium strategies due to the change
in their k − 1st order beliefs, under the original beliefs of i.
Proposition 1. Assume global stability under uncertainty for some b ∈ [0,1).
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Proof. Let µ and µ0 be the distributions of s∗





−i ◦ φ are two random variables coming from the










































































5. Sufficient conditions for stability
In this section we present two sets of suﬃcient conditions for global stability
under uncertainty. Both sets of conditions are closely related to global stability
under certainty. We ﬁrst present a general class of games where global stability
under uncertainty is closely related to global stability under certainty. This
class is characterized by Assumption 1a.







= fi (E [gi (a,s−i)])
where expectation is taken with respect to ti
0×µ ∈ ∆(A × S−i); fi : X → Si and
gi : A × S−i → X are two Lipschitz continuous functions deﬁned through some
Banach space (X,dX); i.e., there exist αi and βi such that di (fi (x),f i (x0)) ≤













Note that the functional form in (5.1) is satisﬁed whenever ui is analytical
and the optimization problem has an interior solution. (The Taylor expansion
for the ﬁrst order condition would imply such a functional form, where E [gi]
is the vector of all moments.) The more substantial part of this assumption is
that fi and gi are Lipschitz continuous. Under certainty, Assumption 1a yieldsHIGHER-ORDER UNCERTAINTY 15
a best response function
BRi (a,s−i)=fi (gi (a,s−i)) ≡ hi (a,s−i).













at each a for some bi < 1.T h e
latter condition is slightly weaker than the following assumption.
Assumption 1b.F o re a c hi ∈ N,w eh a v ebi ≡ αiβi < 1.
Proposition 2. Assumptions 1a and 1b imply global stability under uncertainty.
Proof. In the Appendix. ¤
That is, under Assumption 1a, global stability under uncertainty is implied by
the existence of αi’s and βi’s that satisfy Assumption 1b. Moreover, whenever
f or g is the identity, global stability under certainty and uncertainty will be
equivalent. Hence, there is a close link between these two concepts. Although
Assumption 1 might not be easy to check in general, our next example presents
a general class of games where these conditions can be easily checked.
Example 2. For each i ∈ N,t a k eSi =[ x, ¯ x] for some x, ¯ x ∈ R and
ui (a,si,s −i)=φi (si)gi (a,s−i) − ci (si),
where gi : A×S−i → R is a continuously diﬀerentiable function with |∂gi/∂sj| <
βi for each j 6= i and for some βi ∈ R,a n dφi and ci are twice continuously
diﬀerentiable functions with φ
0
i > 0, φ
00
i < 0, c0
i > 0,a n dc00
i ≥ 0.N o t e t h a t








= fi (E [gi (a,s−i)])
where fi (z) is x if z<c 0 (x)/φ
0 (x), ¯ x if z>c(¯ x)/φ
0 (¯ x), and it is the unique so-
lution x to the ﬁrst order condition c0 (x)/φ
0 (x)=z otherwise. By the inverse-
function theorem, fi is also Lipschitz continuous with parameter αi =1 /γi
where γi =m i n x∈[x,¯ x] (c0 (x)/φ
0 (x))
0 > 0. Therefore, global stability is satisﬁed
whenever b ≡ maxi∈N βi/γi < 1.16 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
Focusing on games where the agents’ strategy spaces are one-dimensional, our
next result presents a simple suﬃcient condition for global stability, and hence
for dampening impact of higher order uncertainty, in terms of second derivatives
of the utility functions.
Proposition 3. For each i,a s s u m eSi ⊂ R, ui (a,·) is twice-continuously dif-
ferentiable, ui (a,·,s −i) is strictly concave, ∂2ui/∂s2
i is bounded away from zero,
and








Then, we have global stability under uncertainty whenever (i) BRi (t1
i,µ) is in
the interior of Si for all t1
i × µ, or (ii) Si is convex.
Proof. In the Appendix. ¤
Example 3. Consider Cournot oligopoly with linear inverse-demand function
P and arbitrary cost function ci with c00
i ≥ 0 (where both P and ci may depend
on parameter a.) Check that |∂2ui/∂si∂sj| = |P0| and |∂2ui/∂s2
i| =2|P0| + c00
i,
so that









6. Equilibrium Impact with Independence
In this section, using the embedding metric deﬁned above, we will put a
natural metric on the type space, which will allow us to compare variations in
diﬀerent orders of the type space. We will show that, under the previously stated
conditions, variations in higher-order beliefs have a lower impact on equilibrium
behavior than comparable variations in lower-order beliefs.
6.1. Embedding metric on beliefs. We now apply the embedding-metric
construction inductively to deﬁne our embedding metric on beliefs of each playerHIGHER-ORDER UNCERTAINTY 17

























































where Y and Y 0 take values in ∆
n−1
k−1 (whose generic member is t
k−1

























6.2. Dampening impact of higher-order uncertainty. Assuming global
stability, we will now ﬁnd an upper bound for the change in equilibrium strat-
egy caused by a change in any kth-order beliefs. When we consider comparable
changes (according to d)a ta l lo r d e r sk, this bound will be decreasing exponen-
tially in k.
Proposition 4. Assume that, for each i ∈ N, BRi (·,µ) is Lipschitz continuous





























for some α ∈ R. Assume also global stability under uncertainty for parameter
























The conclusion can be spelled out as follows: Change the beliefs of a player at
some order k while all the other beliefs are ﬁxed. The change in the equilibrium
strategy due to this change in the beliefs is at most an exponentially decreasing
function of k times the change in the beliefs according to our embedding metric.18 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
In other words, the bound of the rate of change in equilibrium strategy as a
function of kth-order belief is exponentially decreasing in k.
Proof. Firstly, for k =1 , (6.2) is just (6.1). Now assume that (6.2) holds at





























For any ﬁxed t and i ∈ N,l e tu sd e ﬁne f : ∆
n−1







































































i ◦ f−1 and ˜ tk
i ◦ f−1 are the distributions of s∗
−i under ti and ti\˜ tk
i.










































In case we only know a player’s beliefs up to kth order and have no knowledge
of his beliefs at higher orders, the following result tells us the accuracy with
which we can predict his equilibrium behavior. This is important because, as
argued in the Introduction, modelers would prefer not to have to specify the
players’ higher-order beliefs. This result might be thought to be a corollary to
Proposition 4; it can be obtained simply by adding the eﬀects of changes at
k +1 st and all higher orders. The validity of this inﬁnite summation, however,
will be established only when we prove Proposition 8, which is a more general
form of this proposition and only assumes global stability and boundedness ofHIGHER-ORDER UNCERTAINTY 19
the strategy space.6 Notice also that our present result does not refer to any
t o p o l o g yo nt h et y p es p a c e– a l t h o u g hw eu s e do u re m b e d d i n gm e t r i ct or e a c h
this result.
Proposition 5. Under the assumptions and the notation of Proposition 4, let
DA =m a x a,a0∈A d(a,a0).L e t ti, ˜ ti be such that tl
i = ˜ tl
i for all l ≤ k for some













In certain cases, a modeler might want to predict the equilibrium behavior
within a certain margin of error. For example, checking the validity of certain
qualitative predictions of his theories may only require the knowledge of equi-
librium strategies within a certain margin of error. Proposition 5 tells us how
many orders of uncertainty he needs to specify. It implies that, given any  >0
and any t ∈ T,i fw ek n o wt up to the order
(6.4) k ≥
log( ) − log(αDA/(1 − b))
log(b)
,
then we can compute the equilibrium strategies up to a maximum error of
 . Notice that the expression on the right-hand side is increasing in b and
decreasing in  .
6.3. Continuity in product topology. Many authors emphasized that equi-
librium strategy is not continuous with respect to the product topology on type
space and introduced stronger topologies, such as the topology of uniform con-
vergence, in order to make the equilibrium strategies continuous (see Monderer
and Samet (1996) and Kajii and Morris (1998)). (The equilibrium correspon-
dence fails to be lower semi-continuous.) These authors require uniform con-
vergence over all games, in essence focusing on the worst-case games, such as
e-mail game which has high dependence on higher order beliefs. Moreover, they
6This inﬁnite summation would give us a proof only if we had continuity at inﬁnity, i.e.,
for any sequence {t[l]}l∈N of types such that t[l] is identical to some ﬁxed type t at the ﬁrst
l orders, liml→∞ ds
∗
(t[l],t)=0 . Proposition 8 implies the latter statement as an immediate
corollary.20 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
consider the games with discrete strategy-spaces, where the best-response cor-
respondence cannot usually have any continuous selection, which is needed for
global stability. Here we ﬁx a game, and ask whether the equilibrium strategies
of this game are continuous with respect to a product topology. Our next re-
sult answers this question in the aﬃrmative for games satisfying global stability
under uncertainty and for the product topology on type space generated by the
embedding metric on beliefs.
Note that this topology is the topology of pointwise convergence under the
embedding metric. That is, equilibrium strategy s∗
i is continuous with respect




i,m → ˆ t
k













where convergence of beliefs at each order is according to the embedding metric.
Also, because the space of beliefs is compact under the embedding metric, this


















where b is any number in (0,1). Our next result states that, under global sta-
bility, the equilibrium strategy is Lipschitz continuous with respect to a Fréchet
metric, and hence it is continuous in the product topology.
Proposition 6. Under the assumptions and the notation of Proposition 4, in
the model with independence, for each i ∈ N, the equilibrium strategy s∗
i of
player i is Lipschitz continuous with respect to db.I nt h a tc a s e ,s∗
i is continuous
with respect to the product topology on type space generated by the embedding
metric on beliefs at each order.







i if l ≤ k,
˜ tl
i otherwiseHIGHER-ORDER UNCERTAINTY 21


















































where α is as deﬁned in Proposition 4, proving the result. To see the ﬁrst in-
equality, note that we can change ˜ ti to ti by changing ˜ tk
i to tk
i one at a time.


















 .S i n c e  i sa r b i t r a r y ,t h i sy i e l d st h ei n e q u a l i t y .T h en e x te q u a l i t yi sb yd e ﬁni-
tion; the next inequality Proposition 4, and the last equality is by deﬁnition. ¤
Corollary 1. Assume that players’ best responses are always unique and satisfy
global stability under uncertainty. Deﬁne equilibrium correspondence Σ∗ by set-
ting Σ∗ (t)={s∗ (t)|s∗ is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium} at each t ∈ T.T h e n ,
under the assumptions of Proposition 4, Σ∗ is lower semi-continuous with re-
spect to the product topology on type space generated by the embedding metric
on beliefs at each order.
Proof. Take any t,a n ys∗ (t) ∈ Σ∗ (t), and sequence t(n) that converges to t
in the topology above. By deﬁnition s∗ (t) is the value of a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium s∗ at t. Then, by Proposition 6, s∗ (t(n)) ∈ Σ∗ (t(n)) converges to
s∗ (t). ¤
7. Without independence
We will now deﬁne the universal type space without imposing independence.
We will show that our main result, namely Proposition 5, generalizes to this
structure.
General model (without independence). The independence assumption
was built into our previous model to allow for simpler notation and a clearer
consideration of the eﬀects of changing beliefs at a single order. In order to allow
for the general case, we will need to consider the usual (and more complicated)22 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
construction of the universal type space by Brandenburger and Dekel (1993), a
variant of an earlier construction by Mertens and Zamir (1985). The meanings
of kth-order beliefs in our two models are not parallel, as in the new model the
kth-order belief will contain information about all lower orders as well. We will
deﬁne our types using the auxiliary sequence {Xk} of sets deﬁned inductively
by X0 = A and Xk =[ ∆(Xk−1)]
n × Xk−1 for each k>0.W ee n d o we a c hXk
with the weak topology and the σ-algebra generated by this topology, yielding
a standard separable Borel space as A is a Polish space. A player i’s ﬁrst or-
der beliefs are represented by a probability distribution τ1
i on X0, second order
b e l i e f s( a b o u ta l lp l a y e r s ’ﬁr s to r d e rb e l i e f sa n dt h eu n d e r l y i n gu n c e r t a i n t y )a r e
represented by a probability distribution τ2
i on X1, etc. Therefore, a type τi of
ap l a y e ri is a member of
Q∞
k=1 ∆(Xk−1). Since a player’s kth-order beliefs now
contain information about his lower order beliefs, we need the usual coherence
requirements. We write T for the subset of (
Q∞
k=1 ∆(Xk−1))
n in which it is
common knowledge that the players’ beliefs are coherent, i.e., the players know
their own beliefs and their marginals from diﬀerent orders agree. We will use
the variables τ,˜ τ ∈ T as generic type proﬁles. The rest of the model in Section
3 is unchanged.
Dropping the independence assumption causes two complications. First, since
a player’s higher-order beliefs contain information about his lower-order beliefs,
we can no longer vary a player’s belief at order k and keep his beliefs at order
l>kconstant –as in Proposition 4– without violating the coherency require-
ments. Instead, we allow all the beliefs at all orders higher than k to vary (as
in Proposition 5). Second, since the other players’ actions are now (possibly)
perceived to be correlated with the underlying uncertainty, we need to extend
our deﬁnition of global stability to allow such correlation. To do this, let ¯ d−i be















for each a ∈ A and s−i,s 0
−i ∈ S−i, so that the metric d−i on S−i is preserved when
S−i is embedded in A×S−i.E x t e n da l s o¯ d−i to ∆(A × S−i) using the embedding
metric as before. We are able to leave the metric ¯ d−i only partially speciﬁedHIGHER-ORDER UNCERTAINTY 23
since global stability is related only to responsiveness of the best response with
respect to the changes in the other players’ strategies. Thus we will be able to
prove that as long as the inequality below is satiﬁed for some ¯ d−i our results
will hold.
Global Stability under uncertainty in general model.W es a yt h a tglobal
stability under uncertainty holds iﬀ there exist some b ∈ [0,1) and some embed-
ding metric ¯ d−i on ∆(A × S−i) satifying (7.1) and such that, given any i ∈ N
and any π, π0 ∈ ∆(A × S−i) with margAπ =m argAπ0,w eh a v e
(7.2) di (BRi (π),BR i (π
0)) ≤ b¯ d−i (π,π
0).
The next propostion extend Propositions 2 and 3 to the present set up. One
can also check that Example 2 of Section 5 remains valid under the new deﬁni-
tion, while we will have global stability under the new deﬁnition in Example 3
whenever maxa |P0| ≤ 2min a |P0|.
Proposition 7. (a) Assumptions 1a and 1b imply global stability under un-
certainty. (b) For each i, assume Si ⊂ R, ui (a,·) is twice-continuously diﬀer-
entiable, ui (a,·,s −i) is strictly concave, ∂2ui/∂s2









Then, we have global stability under uncertainty whenever (i) BRi (π) is in the
interior of Si for all π,o r( i i )Si is convex.
Proof. In the Appendix. ¤
We are now ready to state our main result, which extends Proposition 5 to
our general model.
Proposition 8. Let DS =m a x i∈N supπ,π0∈∆(A×S−i) di (BRi (π),BR i (π0)) ∈ R.
Let also τ,˜ τ ∈ T be such that τl
i =˜ τl
i for all l ≤ k for some k ≥ 0.A s s u m e





i (˜ τi)) ≤ b
kDS.24 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
Notice that our result assumes only global stability and boundedness of the
strategy space. Under these two assumptions we reach the conclusion that, if we
know the beliefs up to a certain order k, we can know the equilibrium play within
a bound of error that is an exponentially decreasing function of k, bounding the
maximum impact all the higher-order beliefs can have on equilibrium. Our
result does not refer to any topology on the type space. Finally, DS is chosen
as a bound on the variations in equilibrium outcomes. If there are other known
bounds on the equilibrium outcomes (perhaps due to some support restrictions),
then we can replace DS with these bounds. In the remainder of the section we
prove our proposition. We start with the following technical lemma.
Lemma 2. Let (X,ΣX), (Y,ΣY), (Z,ΣZ) be separable standard Borel spaces,
and endow X ×Y , Y ×Z, X ×Z,a n dX ×Y ×Z with the σ-algebras generated
by the corresponding product topologies. Let probability measures P and P0 on
X × Y and X × Z, respectively, be such that margXP=m a r g XP0.T h e n ,t h e r e
exists a probability measure ˜ P on X × Y × Z such that margX×Y˜ P=Pand
margX×Z˜ P=P 0.
Proof. In the Appendix. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 .Deﬁne Ω = A×T to be the universal state space. This
is the subset of the larger space ¯ Ω = A×(
Q∞
k=1 ∆(Xk−1))
n in which coherency
is common knowledge. By Brandenburger and Dekel (1993), ¯ Ω is a Polish space,
yielding a standard separable Borel space, and for every τ =( τ1,...,τn) ∈ T





(7.5) margXk−1κτi = τ
k
i (∀k),
and κτi (Ω)=1 .L e t








πτi = κτi ◦ β
−1 ∈ ∆(A × S−i)HIGHER-ORDER UNCERTAINTY 25
for the joint distribution of the underlying uncertainty and the other players’
actions induced by τi.N o t i c et h a ts∗
i (τi)=BRi (πτi).
We will use induction on k.F o r k =0 ,t h i si st r u eb yd e ﬁnition. Fix any






i (˜ τi)) = di (BRi (πτi),BR i (π˜ τi))














where the inequality is due to global stability and ∆πτi,π˜ τi is deﬁned by (3.1).














Combining (7.6) and (7.7), we obtain (7.4).










are the spaces of lower and higher-order beliefs. For k =1 ,w eu s et h ec o n v e n t i o n
that L is a singleton set, and l ∈ L can simply be ignored in the following
analysis for that case. Note that Xk−1 = A × L.





i = margXk−1κ˜ τi,
where the second equality is by our hypothesis. Since we have separable stan-
dard Borel spaces, by Lemma 2, there exists σ ∈ ∆(Xk−1 × H × H) such that
the marginals of σ o nt h ec r o s sp r o d u c to fXk−1 with the ﬁrst and second copies
of H are
marg12σ = κτi and marg13σ = κ˜ τi,
respectively.26 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ





(7.9) γ :( a,l,h1,h 2) 7→ (β (a,l,h1),β(a,l,h2)).





=( marg12σ) ◦ β
−1 = κτi ◦ β
−1 = πτi,
and similarly marg2ν = π˜ τi. Therefore, by deﬁnition, ν ∈ ∆πτi,π˜ τi.

























But by (7.9), s−i = s∗
−i (ˆ τ−i) and s0
−i = s∗
−i (¯ τ−i) f o rs o m et y pep r o ﬁles ˆ τ =( l,h1)






















Since suppν ⊂ I (by construction), (7.12) implies (7.7). ¤
8. Conclusion
Present economic theories are mostly based on equilibrium analysis of models
in which only a few low orders of uncertainty are properly speciﬁed. We know,
however, that in some games higher-order uncertainty may have a large impact
in equilibrium, changing equilibrium behavior profoundly. In this paper we pre-
sented a suﬃcient condition, namely global stability under uncertainty, which
guarantees that the impact of higher-order uncertainty is low. Using the univer-
sal type space, in which players can entertain any coherent set of beliefs, we have
shown under this assumption that if we specify the players’ beliefs up to some
order k, we will know their equilibrium behavior within a bound that decreases
exponentially in k (cf. Proposition 8). That is, if a theoretical prediction re-
quires knowledge of the strategies within a margin   of error, then the researcherHIGHER-ORDER UNCERTAINTY 27
can validate his theory by specifying ﬁrst k( ) orders of beliefs, where k( ) is
a logarithmic function of  . Under a further independence assumption we also
formalize our notion that, under stability, the marginal impact of higher-order
uncertainty is (exponentially) decreasing in the order (cf. Propositions 1 and
4).7 That is, the problem must be approximated using lower-order uncertainty
rather than higher-order uncertainty; this may be reversed when stability does
not hold, as the impact of higher-order uncertainty may grow exponentially. In
the latter case, we believe that accurate prediction using traditional analysis
will be impossible.
Our study has two important limitations which require further research, im-
posed by our use of normal-form representation and the solution concept of
(unrestricted) Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Firstly, many theories are based on
extensive-form representations and use reﬁnements, such as sequential rational-
ity (Selten (1974), Kreps and Wilson (1982)). Their predictions are often driven
by these reﬁnements when equilibrium itself does not have any predictive power
in their games. It is then crucial to extend our analysis to such a framework,
using extensive-form constructions, such as Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999).
Secondly, although we are motivated by the wide use of equilibrium analysis,
the concept of equilibrium has only very limited epistemic support (see Aumann
and Brandenburger (1995) and Dekel and Gul (1997)). Hence, extension of our
work for better-founded concepts, such as rationalizability, will be useful; our re-
sults would also be complemented by extensions of Milgrom and Roberts’ (1990)
results to universal type space, bounding rationalizable strategies by equilibria.
Appendix A. Omitted Proofs
A.1. P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .Take any µ, µ0 ∈ ∆(X),a n dﬁxa n y >0.B y
deﬁnition of dX (µ,µ0),t h e r ee x i s t sν ∈ ∆µ,µ0 such that
(A.1) Eν [dX (x1,x 2)] ≤ dX (µ,µ
0)+ .
7It also follows from these assumptions that the equilibrium strategy is continuous in
player’s type with respect to a product topology (cf. Proposition 6).28 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
Deﬁne ¯ f : X2 → Z2 by ¯ f (x1,x 2)=( f (x1),f(x2)). Then, by deﬁnition,







≤ Eν◦ ¯ f−1 [dZ (z1,z 2)]
= Eν [dZ (f (x1),f(x2))]
≤ Eν [λdX (x1,x 2)] = λEν [dX (x1,x 2)]
≤ λdX (µ,µ
0)+λ ;
since   is arbitrary, the result follows. [Here, the ﬁrst inequality is by (3.2); the
next equality is by change of variables, the next inequality is by the hypothesis,
and the last inequality is by (A.1).] ¤
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2. Take any i ∈ N, t1
i ∈ ∆(A),a n da n yµ, µ0 ∈








.T a k e a n y
random variable a with distribution t1
i ∈ ∆(A), and any two random variables
s−i and s0
−i with distributions µ and µ0, respectively. By Assumption 1, we have
BRi (t1











di (BRi (µ),BR i (µ
0)) = di
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where the ﬁrst and the last inequalities are due to Assumption 1, and the second
inequality is by triangle inequality. Since s−i and s0
−i are arbitrary, this yields
di (BRi (µ),BR i (µ
0)) ≤ bid−i (µ,µ
0).
A.3. P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .Take any t1
i ∈ ∆(A) and µ,µ0 ∈ ∆(S−i).W e
will assume BRi (ti,µ) and BRi (ti,µ 0) are in the interior of Si.( W h e n Si is
convex, we can take BRi (ti,µ) and BRi (ti,µ 0) as the unconstrained optima, as
in that case the variations in the constrained optima are if anything less than















ij for the ﬁrst and second order partial derivatives of
Ui with respect to si, and the cross partial with respect si and sj, respectively.
Firstly, since BRi (µ) and BRi (µ0) are in the interior, the ﬁrst order conditions
































be the value of the derivative at BRi (µ) for the optimization problem with µ0.
We will now ﬁnd upper and lower bounds for |J|, and these bounds will yield

















































































Here the ﬁr s te q u a l i t yi sb yd e ﬁnition, the second equality is by (A.2), and the
following inequality is is by the triangle inequality. To derive the penultimate







i (BRi (µ),s −i) a st h es o m eo ft h e
changes that we would get by changing each coordinate in turn, and apply the
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¢¯ ¯|BRi (µ) − BRi (µ
0)|. (A.5)
Here the ﬁrst and the second equalities are by deﬁnition and (A.3), respectively.




















sign. The inequality in the next line is again by the mean value theorem, and the
last equality is because the term inside the expectation is a constant. Combining








and that s−i and s0
−i are arbitrary, we obtain
|BRi (µ) − BRi (µ

































































A.4. P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 .The proof of part (b) is very similar to the
proof of Proposition 3 above. We will prove part (a).HIGHER-ORDER UNCERTAINTY 31











, hence, for each π, π0 with
margAπ =m a r g Aπ0,w eh a v eBRi (π)=fi (Eπ (˜ gi (a))) = fi (Eπ0 (˜ gi (a))) =
BRi (π0), yielding di (BRi (π),BR i (π0)) = 0 ≤ bi ¯ d−i (π,π0) for any ¯ d−i.
Now assume that βi > 0.S i n c egi is continuous and A×S−i is compact, there


















Deﬁne a metric dA,i on A by setting dA,i (a,a0)=Mi/βi at each distinct a,a0,
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where the ﬁrst inequality is derived as in the proof of Proposition 2, the next
equality is by additivity, the next equality is by (A.6) and the Lipschitz conti-
nuity of gi, the next inequality is by the non-negativity of d−i,a n dt h el a s tt w o






are arbitrary, this shows that di (BRi (π),BR i (π0)) ≤ biE
£¯ d−i (π,π0)
¤
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A.5. P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .Let ˆ P ≡ margXP=m a r g XP0.S i n c e w e h a v e
separable standard Borel spaces, there exists conditional probability P (·||·):
(ΣX×Y) × (X × Y ) → [0,1] with respect to the σ-ﬁeld ΣX ×{ Y },a n dw es i m -
ply write P (B|x) for P (X × B||(x,y)) where y can be chosen arbitrarily. We
deﬁne P0 (C|x) similarly for each C ∈ ΣZ.N o t i c et h a tP (·|x) and P0 (·|x) are
probability distributions on (Y,ΣY) and (Z,ΣZ), respectively.8 For each x ∈ X,
let
˜ Px ≡ P (·|x) × P
0 (·|x)
be the product measure of P (·|x) and P0 (·|x) on Y ×Z,a n dd e ﬁne probability
measure ˜ P by setting
˜ P (F)=
Z
˜ Px (Fx)d ˆ P (x)
at each measurable set F ⊆ X × Y × Z where
Fx = {(y,z) ∈ Y × Z|(x,y,z) ∈ F}.
Notice that, for any rectangle A × B × C ∈ ΣX × ΣY × ΣZ,
˜ P (A × B × C)=
Z
χA (x)P (B|x)P
0 (C|x)d ˆ P (x),
where χA denotes the characteristic function of A.
N o ww es h o wt h a t ˜ P satisﬁes the statement of the lemma. For each A ∈ ΣX
and B ∈ ΣY,w eh a v e




0 (Z|x)d ˆ P (x)
=
Z
χA (x)P (B|x)d ˆ P (x)
≡ P (A × B).
Since the probability measures margX×Y˜ P and P agree on the π-system of all
rectangles A×B, which generates the entire σ-ﬁeld on X ×Y , by Dynkin’s π-λ
Theorem they are equal. This is similarly true for margX×Z˜ P and P0.
8See Parthasaraty (1967) for the results of probability theory in this proof.HIGHER-ORDER UNCERTAINTY 33
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